I. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, CERTAIN QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS (DJIBOUTI V FRANCE) JUDGMENT OF 4 JUNE 2008 by Cryer, R. & Kalpouzos, I.
Cryer, R. & Kalpouzos, I. (2010). I. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, CERTAIN 
QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS (DJIBOUTI V FRANCE) 
JUDGMENT OF 4 JUNE 2008. INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY, 59(1), 
doi: 10.1017/S0020589309990145 
City Research Online
Original citation: Cryer, R. & Kalpouzos, I. (2010). I. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 
CERTAIN QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS (DJIBOUTI V 
FRANCE) JUDGMENT OF 4 JUNE 2008. INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY, 
59(1), doi: 10.1017/S0020589309990145 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/7139/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 29 Jan 2010 IP address: 81.151.118.138
DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
Edited by J Craig Barker
I. International Court of Justice Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France) Judgment of 4 June 2008
II. The International Criminal Court Arrest Warrant Decision For
President Al Bashir of Sudan
I. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, CERTAIN QUESTIONS OF
MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS (DJIBOUTI V FRANCE)
JUDGMENT OF 4 JUNE 20081
A. The Facts
Judge Borrel, a French national, had been seconded to the Ministry of Justice of
Djibouti. He did not return alive: His body was found outside the city of Djibouti in
October 2005. This led to judicial proceedings in both States, which put Franco-
Djiboutian judicial cooperation to the test. Although the ofﬁcial Djiboutian view of the
circumstances in which Borrel met his end, conﬁrmed by its initial judicial proceed-
ings, pointed to suicide, a French investigating judge entertained evidence of
involvement of Djiboutian ofﬁcials in his death. Although initially the parallel pro-
ceedings co-existed harmoniously, with Djibouti fully cooperating with France’s re-
quests for cooperation under the 1986 Convention on Mutual Assistance on Criminal
Matters between Djibouti and France, eventually tension erupted, which led to Djibouti
bringing a claim to the ICJ on 9 January 2006.
There were two main bases for the claim. The ﬁrst was the refusal by France to
transmit the voluminous ﬁle of its judicial investigation to Djibouti, after the latter
renewed its own investigation and requested it. The French investigating judge took the
view that the renewed Djiboutian proceedings were an ‘abuse of process’ and that, in
any case, the transmission of the ﬁle would jeopardize vital security information, thus
prejudicing the ‘sovereignty, . . . security,. . . ordre public or other . . . essential inter-
ests’ of France as per article 2(c) of the 1986 Convention. Djibouti claimed that the
refusal constituted a violation of France’s obligations under the 1986 treaty as well as
the 1977 Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the two.
The second bone of contention related to summonses issued to various Djiboutian
ofﬁcials. On 17 May 2005, whilst the President of Djibouti (President Guelleh) was on
an ofﬁcial visit to France, a French judge issued a witness summons for him. The
summons was not issued in accordance with French procedural law. A new summons,
this time in the appropriate form, was issued on 14 February 2007 but, like the ﬁrst,
was leaked, it was alleged by Djibouti, to the French media. Five other summonses
1 Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France) Judgment
of 4 June 2008 ICJ General List no 136 [hereinafter ‘Decision’].
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were issued for the appearance of three other Djiboutian ofﬁcials as ‘te´moins assiste´s’
(legally assisted witnesses) in relation to two other parallel proceedings. In one case
this was a summons to the Djiboutian ambassador to France, in relation to a proceeding
for defamation initiated by Mrs Borrel.2 In the other case, summons for the appearance
of MMDjama Souleiman Ali and Hassan Said Khaireh as te´moins assiste´s, were issued
in 2004 with respect to a case opened on subornation of perjury for the alleged pressure
that they exerted to Djiboutian ofﬁcials to either retract inculpatory statements or make
exculpatory ones. These witnesses did not appear in France. Djibouti claimed, by
letter, that owing to the lack of cooperation of the French judiciary ‘the Republic of
Djibouti, as a sovereign State, cannot accept one-way co-operation of this kind with the
former colonial Power, and [that] the two individuals summoned are therefore not
authorized to give evidence.’3 A French court issued arrest warrants for them on 27
September 2006, and later convicted them in absentia.4 Djibouti claimed that all these
actions violated France’s obligations ‘pursuant to the principles of customary and
general international law to prevent attacks on the freedom, dignity and immunities of’
President Guelleh, and made cognate claims relating to other ‘high ranking’ Djiboutian
ofﬁcials.5
B. The Jurisdiction of the Court
Djibouti issued proceedings in the absence of any recognized jurisdictional basis for
the case, but expressing its conﬁdence ‘that the French republic will agree to submit to
the jurisdiction of the Court to settle’ the dispute pursuant to article 38(5) of the Rules
of the Court, which reads
When the applicant State proposes to found the jurisdiction of the Court upon a consent
thereto yet to be given or manifested by the State against which such application is made,
the application shall be transmitted to that State. It shall not however be entered in the
General List, nor any action be taken in the proceedings, unless and until the State against
which such application is made consents to the Court’s jurisdiction for the purposes of the
case.6
Hence, the Court passed the application on to France and took no further action.
However, rather than ignore or reject the request, France, on 25 July 2006, expressed
its consent to the jurisdiction of the Court ‘pursuant to and solely on the basis of’
article 38(5),7 and making clear that its consent ‘is valid only for the purposes of the
2 Since this had been declared null and void, and France had apologized for its issuance
(Decision, para 34), this played little part in the proceedings.
3 Decision, para 35.
4 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Versailles, Numero d’affaire 0307960961, 27 Mars 2008.
The judgment can be found at http://www.ardhd.org/proces_14mars/27_mars_jugement_sub-
ornationV2.pdf
5 Decision, paras 17–18. After the decision, the convictions were overturned by the Cour
d’Appel de Versailles on 28 May 2009. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/
8073407.stm
6 The practice of not entering the case onto the list was understandably adopted to avoid
polemic or spurious applications gaining entry and publicity, see Decision, para 63, and S Yee,
‘Article 40’ in A Zimmermann et al (eds), The Statute of the International Court of Justice:
A Commentary (OUP, Oxford, 2006) 849, 899–900.
7 Interestingly, France has done this once before, in April 2003, in Certain Criminal
Proceedings in France (Republic of Congo v France), however, that case has yet to come to
judgment.
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case. . .i.e. in respect of the dispute forming the subject of the application and strictly
within the limits of the claim formulated therein’.8 Such consent ought to have given
Djibouti cause for concern. A State that was uncertain of its (legal) grounds would be
unlikely to be such a willing defendant.
As the Court noted, this was the ﬁrst time it had ever fallen to it to determine
jurisdiction under article 38(5), and, as it said, when that article is used
The State which is thus asked to consent to the Court’s jurisdiction. . .is completely free to
respond as it sees ﬁt; if it consents to the Courts jurisdiction, it is for it to specify, if
necessary, the aspects of the dispute which it agrees to submit to the judgement of the
Court. The deferred and ad hoc nature of the Respondent’s consent as contemplated by
Article 38, paragraph 5, of the rules of the Court, makes the procedure set out there a means
of establishing forum prorogatum.9
Here, the consent was express. However, that consent was given in relation to the
Djiboutian application, and therefore, as the Court pointed out, the mutual consent of
the parties had to be established by reference to both the letter expressing consent to
jurisdiction with respect to the application, and the application itself.10 Hence it still
fell to the Court to decide precisely over what France had consented to it determining.
This was, inter alia, because Djibouti sought to raise other issues related to the pro-
ceedings. France, for its part, argued that the dispute which it had consented to the ICJ
hearing was limited to the refusal of the French Courts to execute the letter rogatory
requesting the French ﬁle, and not to other aspects related to the case, such as the
requests to the Head of State and other Djiboutian ofﬁcials to appear as witnesses in
France, as this was the only matter mentioned in the section of the Djiboutian appli-
cation entitled ‘subject of the dispute’.11 There was thus, no dispute about the ICJ’s
right to pronounce on the refusal to execute the letter rogatory.
The Court disagreed with France, and said that its consent was not to be interpreted
solely by reference to the headings in the Djiboutian application, but by reference to it
as a whole.12 There is sense in this; it would be excessively formalistic to use the
headings in an application in a normative sense,13 however, the Court needs to be
careful here not to allow applications to sneak claims in through the back door. In this
case, the part of the application entitled ‘Legal Grounds’ included reference to sum-
monses issued to President Guelleh and other State ofﬁcials, although some of the
summonses Djibouti was seeking to bring before the Court post-dated the application
(as did the arrest warrants).14
The Court indicated that the summonses extant at the time of the application were
within its jurisdiction, the reason being that France had consented to the jurisdiction of
the Court over the ‘subject of the application’, not simply the ‘subject of the dispute’,
and the Application had to be read as a whole. France could have simply ignored the
8 Decision, paras 3–4, 39. 9 Decision, para 63.
10 Decision, paras 65–6.
11 Decsion, para 52. As Djibouti said nothing about the lawfulness of French jurisdiction over
events outside France in the Application, the Court did not consider such matters as having been
consented to by France, Decision, para 200. 12 Decision, para 69.
13 It is also consistent with the decision in the Rights of Passage Case, Decision, para 70,
although Judge Para-Aranguren distinguished that case on the basis that it did not deal with forum
prorogatum, where there is a greater need for care, Separate Opinion of Judge Para-Aranguren,
para 16. This is true, but there can also be undue caution.
14 Decision, para 73.
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application, or limited its consent to the letter rogatory, but chose not to.15With respect
to these particular summonses, this is understandable, and referable to France’s
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court. France had the application, which fairly
clearly included reference to the issued summonses, and consented to the ICJ de-
termining the matters it contained.16
Djibouti also claimed, more controversially, that the Court had jurisdiction to en-
tertain claims relating to the summonses and arrest warrants issued after the date of the
application, as they were related to the claims it had made in the application. The
Court, rightly, was not impressed by such claims with respect to the arrest warrants.
As they said, France’s consent was to the application, and the arrest warrants and
summonses were not mentioned in it, and ‘[w]here jurisdiction is based on forum
prorogatum, great care must be taken regarding the scope of the consent as circum-
scribed by the respondent State.’17 Although, as the Court accepted, in some other
cases, it asked whether consideration of the other issues would ‘transform the nature of
the dispute’, these cases did not relate to forum prorogatum, and, on this point, such
jurisprudence was not applicable: The question was what France consented to in its
letter.18
As such, the arrest warrants, although related to the proceedings at issue ‘represent
new legal acts in respect of which France cannot be considered as having implicitly
accepted the Court’s jurisdiction’ and were thus outside the jurisdiction of the Court.19
Given that France had expressly said that it only consented to the jurisdiction of the
Court for those matters in the application, and strictly within its limits, this is sensible.
In particular with respect to forum prorogatum the Court needs to ensure that it is not
too quick to infer consent, or take a broad view of it. Were it to take an overly elastic
view of consent, the legitimacy of the Court would be negatively affected.20 The
strongest counter-argument to this came from Judge Owada, who asserted that, since,
in this case, the consent was exhibited through documents, the same considerations
ought to apply as do to article 36(2) declarations.21 However, since this was a case of
forum prorogatum, the principles the majority were setting down would apply also to
15 Decision, para 83.
16 Although Judge Para-Aranguen dissented on this, asserting that the French declaration,
read as a whole, only referred to the claims on paragraph 2 of the application (ie the letter
rogatory) para 18–19. He also noted that some other statements of Djibouti only referred to the
letter rogatory. However, this does not alter the fact that the application did include matters
relating to immunities. 17 Decision, para 87.
18 Decision, para 88. Judge Skonikov disagreed with the distinction. See Declaration of Judge
Skotnikov, paras 7–8.
19 ibid. Judge Skotnikov was one of the three dissenters here, asserting that France could not
freeze the dispute at the time of the acceptance ibid para 4. This may be true, but the question is
whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the matters not whether they are ongoing or not.
Judge Owada saw them as a natural part of the process, therefore within the jurisdiction of the
court, on his view of its jurisdiction, para 8–9.
20 See S Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920–2005 (Martinus
Nijhoff, Leiden, 2006) 698–699. More generally see H Lauterpacht, The Development of
International Law by the International Court of Justice (Stevens, London, 1958) Chapter 6.
21 Declaration of Judge Owada, paras 5–6. For the view that there is no requirement that
jurisdiction be interpreted narrowly see A Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in
Public International Law (OUP, Oxford, 2008) Chapter 12, although this does not directly deal
with forum prorogatum.
196 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 29 Jan 2010 IP address: 81.151.118.138
implicit conduct and as such, the possibility of abuse of the doctrine argues in favour of
care.22
With respect to witness summons sent to President Guelleh in 2007, however, the
Court took a slightly different approach. The Court noted that the 2007 invitation was
essentially a repeat of that issued in 2005, and therefore, since the French letter of
acceptance did not contain a temporal limitation, the Court had jurisdiction.23 This is
questionable. Djibouti had rejected the ﬁrst invitation as it did not comply with the
relevant form,24 and the second issuance post-dated the application It must be ques-
tioned whether the second issuance of the request really fell within the scope of French
consent to the Court’s jurisdiction, or its claimed strict interpretation of consent in
forum prorogatum cases.25
C. The 1977 Treaty and The 1986 Convention
The ﬁrst substantive issue the Court entertained was the claim that France, by refusing
to comply with the letter rogatory and sending the summons, had violated its obliga-
tions under the 1977 Treaty on Friendship and Co-operation and the 1986 Convention
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. The claims pointed to violations of both
treaties separately and in combination. In particular the latter aspect leads to some
interesting legal issues.
Djibouti argued that France’s refusal to execute the letter rogatory, ‘act[ed] in dis-
regard of the principles of equality, mutual respect and peace set out in Article 1 of the
1977 Treaty.’26 This treaty provides for ‘friendly relations [. . .] and the co-operation
[. . .] in the political, military, economic, ﬁnancial, cultural, social and technical ﬁelds’
in the Preamble, as well as ‘equality, mutual respect and peace’ in article 1. These
general clauses were complemented by provisions on co-operation in speciﬁc ﬁelds in
articles 3 to 5 (which did not include judicial cooperation).27 Relying on article 6,
providing for the establishment of a ‘France-Djibouti Co-operation Commission’,
Djibouti argued that the Treaty
‘oversees’ . . . all the other successive bilateral agreements, including the 1986 Con-
vention, and must be observed in all areas with which they are concerned. In other words,
all agreements subsequent to 1977 must be interpreted and applied in the light of the object
and purpose of the 1977 Treaty and the undertakings regarding co-operation that derive
from it.
Therefore, any serious violation of a subsequent treaty ‘automatically and simul-
taneously’ amounted to a breach of the 1977 Treaty.28
There are two sides to Djibouti’s claim. The ﬁrst one is that the 1977 Treaty itself
was violated and the second one that the 1977 Treaty inﬂuences the interpretation of
the 1986 Treaty and, conversely, a violation of the latter is a violation of the former. In
22 Yee (n 5) 902–904. 23 Decision, para 95.
24 As Judge Skotnikov said, France accepted the ﬁrst act was a nullity, therefore this was not
simply a repetition (Skotnikov, paras 12–3), although he would have accepted jurisdiction over it
as he rejected the distinction between forum prorogatum and other instances of jurisdiction.
25 See De´claration de M Le Juge ad hoc Guillaume, para 12; Opinion Individuelle de M le
Juge Ranjeva, paras 1–13; Opinion Individuelle de M le Juge Tomka.
26 Decision, para 96. 27 Decision, para 97.
28 Decision, para 100.
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relation to the ﬁrst part of the claim the Court admitted that the obligations in the 1977
Treaty are ‘obligations of law, articulated as obligations of conduct or, in this case, co-
operation, of a broad and general nature. . .’29 but observed that criminal cooperation
was not included in the speciﬁc issues dealt with by the Treaty. Although it did not say
so explicitly, this means that it rejected Djibouti’s argument that the enumeration was
indicative rather than exhaustive. In support, it quoted its Judgment in Nicaragua to the
effect that
[t]here must be a distinction, even in the case of a treaty of friendship, between the broad
category of unfriendly acts, and the narrower category of acts tending to defeat the object
and purpose of the Treaty. That object and purpose is the effective implementation of
friendship in the speciﬁc ﬁelds provided for in the Treaty, not friendship in a vague general
sense.30
Accordingly, as the Court had already said in the Oil Platforms case, the objective of
friendship and co-operation, although not without legal signiﬁcance, can only be used
in relation to the speciﬁc areas mentioned in the same Treaty.31
As judicial co-operation was not mentioned in the 1977 Treaty, however, the gen-
eral obligation of co-operation would only be legally relevant to the case if it could
inﬂuence the obligations not in that treaty, but also in a subsequent one, here the 1986
Convention.32 There the authority of Nicaragua and Oil Platforms ends as the relation
between the general and the speciﬁc in these decisions did not deal with subsequent
Treaties.33 The Court’s answer to this is two-fold and rather contradictory. The Court
argued that the general obligation of the 1977 Treaty is, once more, not relevant to the
extent that judicial co-operation is not mentioned in that Treaty. If it was mentioned,
the Court appears to argue, article 1 would be emancipated from the 1977 Treaty and
this was not the case.
This, however, is not the end of it. The general clause is reincarnated as a ‘relevant
rule of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ pursuant to
article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Hence, the general
obligation for ‘equality and mutual respect . . . co-operation and friendship’34 is rel-
evant, but only as a matter of interpretation of the 1986 Treaty. Therefore the general
clause is given independent legal signiﬁcance, if only as an interpretative guideline.
This signiﬁcance, however, after being carefully constructed, is quickly rendered
nugatory, as ‘[a]n interpretation of the 1986 Convention duly taking into account the
spirit of friendship and co-operation stipulated in the 1977 Treaty cannot possibly stand
in the way of a party to that Convention relying on a clause contained in it which
allows for non-performance of a conventional obligation under certain circum-
stances.’35
This conclusion seems sensible, but the Court, by not explaining the difference
between normative applicability and interpretative relevance, oscillates somewhat
confusingly on the relationship between the general and speciﬁc rules. While this
29 Decision, para 104.
30 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States
of America) [1986] ICJ Rep 4, para 273.
31 Decision, para 109, citing Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of
America) [1996] ICJ Rep (II) 815, para 31.
32 And, speciﬁcally, as will be seen, article 2(c) of that Convention stipulating the reasons
why a State can refuse co-operation. 33 Decision, para 110.
34 Decision, para 113. 35 Decision, para. 114.
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might allow the Court to position itself for the further interpretation of the lex specialis,
in the process, the relation between general framework agreements and subsequent
speciﬁc ones is not doctrinally clariﬁed.
D. Judicial Co-Operation Under The 1986 Convention
While the 1986 Convention created an obligation of co-operation between the States,
article 2(c) allows either State to refuse assistance ‘if the requested State considers that
execution of the request is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, its security, its ordre
public or others of its essential interests.’ Because article 2(c), appeared to defer to the
refusing State, Djibouti’s arguments on France’s obligation attempted to appeal to
general principles and obligations to undermine or relativize the article. The more
general rules and principles could be used to interpret article 2, the more its application
by the State could be second-guessed. While the use, for this purpose, of the 1977
Treaty failed, Djibouti attempted a similar strategy in relation to the 1986 Convention.
It claimed that the reference in article 1 of the Convention to the mutuality of assist-
ance created ‘reciprocity in commitments’, which, due to Djibouti’s previous exemp-
lary co-operation in the matter, should lead to an obligation of result, ie to execute the
letter rogatory.36
The reciprocity argument got short shrift from the Court: article 2(c) undermined it.
As the Court correctly said: ‘it is the provisions of the Convention which must be
looked to in determining case by case whether or not a State has breached its mutual
assistance obligations. . ..[T]he way in which the concept of reciprocity is advanced by
Djibouti would render without effect the exceptions listed in Article 2.’37 Thus the
general feeling of inequality and injustice that inspired the Djiboutian argument was
not translated into law.38
However, Djibouti argued for an obligation of result independently of reciprocity
averring that:
[W]hile the provision does state that execution must take place ‘in accordance with [the]
law’ of the requested State, this must be interpreted as simply an indication of the pro-
cedure to be followed in performing this ‘obligation of result’, not a means of shirking it.
The argument was referred to article 27 of the VCLT’s admonition that internal law is
no justiﬁcation for treaty violation. France countered that the requirement was not one
of result, but of conduct, such that ‘the means determines the outcome. . .’39
The VCLT angle in Djibouti’s argument was problematic. The argument failed to
account for the fact that the treaty defers aspects of their application to the municipal
legal process. As the Court said, ‘[w]hile it must of course ensure that the procedure is
put in motion, the State does not thereby guarantee the outcome. . .’40 Even so, ques-
tions remain; can the municipal legal conduct be second-guessed? Does the obligation
stop at setting a certain process in motion or does it extend to the conduct during the
process? If so how could this conduct be scrutinized?
36 Decision, paras 116, 121. 37 Decision, para 119.
38 Although, it survived in some of the judges’ perceptions. See Judge Koroma’s Separate
Opinion, para 10. 39 Decision, paras 121–2.
40 Decision, para 123.
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The Court therefore had to delimit its powers of examination over the municipal
judge’s conduct. The judge had expressed, if not sent to Djibouti, the reasons for her
refusal in a letter (soit-transmis) sent to the French Procureur Ge´ne´ral and in the
following terms: ‘Handing over our record would entail indirectly delivering French
intelligence service documents to a foreign political authority. Without contributing in
any way to the discovery of the truth, such transmission would seriously compromise
the fundamental interests of the country and the security of its agents.’
The Court, having already rejected general principles such as reciprocity or those
emanating from the 1977 Treaty, did not wish, though, to completely defer to the
French judge’s appreciation of the matter. It therefore turned to the principle of good
faith, as included, inter alia, in article 26 of the VCLT.41 This may have been because it
provided a ﬂexible but generally accepted way for the Court to look at France’s actions
and judge them on their own terms. This seems sensible in terms of both law and
judicial strategy. The Court interpreted ‘good faith’ as requiring it to be shown that the
judge’s reasoning was within article 2(c) and that it was made with right authority.42
The latter element was settled by the Paris Court of Appeal in its judgment of
19 October 2006 which held that the application of article 2 ‘is a matter solely for the
investigating judge’. As they said, ‘It is not for this Court to do other than accept the
ﬁndings of the Paris Court of Appeals on this point.’43
The former element was also viewed as unproblematic. Although the Court did not
see how the judge’s reasons meant that the ﬁle could not be sent after the intelligence
documents had been removed, it declared itself convinced by France’s written and oral
pleadings that the intelligence information in fact ‘permeated the entire ﬁle’. As such,
the Court found, without further ado, that the Judge’s reasons fell within article 2(c).44
This, again, might well be the sensible result. Nevertheless, the Court should have
explained how it reached it. It is not unreasonable to read an element of derision for the
Djiboutian judicial process in the French Judge’s words. A more sophisticated dis-
cussion of ‘good faith’ and a more transparent application of that principle in assessing
the French judiciary’s actions would fend off accusations that the Court chose to
interpret good faith as a toothless concept in order to fully defer to the French judge’s
decision.45
Article 17 of the 1986 Convention, however, also requires the parties to ‘give
reasons . . . for any refusal of mutual assistance’. France, the Court decided that had
failed to communicate the judge’s decision to Djibouti. Although France claimed that
it had sent a letter to Djibouti referring to article 2(c) its receipt was not proved, and, in
any event, the mere reference to article 2(c) would have been insufﬁcient.46 For
41 The Court provided some pedigree in the use of ‘good faith’, quoting the decisions of the
PCIJ in the cases of Polish Upper Silesia and Free Zones of Upper Savoy, para 145. Judge Keith
argued that the criterion of ‘good faith’ in these decisions existed alongside ‘abuse of rights’ or
de´tournement de pouvoir. He entertained the possibility that the judge’s language pointed towards
such de´tournement but decided it probably did not, Declaration of Judge Keith, para 5–11.
42 Decision, para 145. 43 Decision, para 146.
44 Decision, para 148.
45 Some of this necessary discussion is provided in Judge Keith’s clear and pertinent
declaration. He perceptively points out, at para 10, the distinction between the State’s assessment
of its national interests, which cannot be second-guessed, and the assessment of the compatibility
of the State’s actions with the purpose of the Convention. It seems that the clarity of the former
imposed on the willingness of the Court to engage with the latter.
46 Decision, para 152.
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Djibouti the requirement of giving reasons was ‘a condition of the validity of the
refusal’.47 For France, the requirement of giving reasons was separate to the question
of refusal per se.48 The Court again sided with France, as ‘the terms of the Convention
do not suggest that recourse to Article 2 is dependent upon compliance with Article 17.
Further, had it been so intended by the Parties, this would have been expressly stipu-
lated in the Convention.’49
Thus, the Court interpreted the obligation to give reasons as an obligation to
communicate them. As Judge Keith observed, one of the functions of the obligation to
give reasons is to ‘inform the requesting State whether the power has been properly
exercised in accordance with the law’.50 Of course, some justiﬁcation is necessary if
there is to be any second-guessing of conduct.51 However, this weakened obligation of
justiﬁcation, to communicate the reasons, was the only point where France was found
in breach of its legal obligations.52
E: Heads of State, Immunities and Assertions of Jurisdiction
Moving on to the other matter at issue between the parties, as the Court found that it
had jurisdiction to determine the lawfulness of the ‘invitation’ to President Guelleh to
appear as a witness it was led to an often overlooked aspect of the nature of jurisdic-
tion, namely, what amounts to an assertion of adjudicative jurisdiction. This is a matter
that has caused considerable confusion, inter alia, in relation to universal jurisdiction.53
Parts of the Court have perhaps contributed to the confusion with rather ill-advised
obiter comments in the Yerodia case.54 In this case, however the Court, minus only
judge ad hoc Yusuf, took an understandable and appropriate approach. In relation to
the 2005 request, which invited President Guelleh to come to the Judge’s ofﬁce the
next day, leaving aside issues of comity, the Court decided it was not an assertion of
jurisdiction.
It is true that the French Code of Procedure provides that if a person refuses to attend
pursuant to a request, they may be required to do so by coercive process. However, this
fact was not included in the request and France accepted that the request was issued
contrary to French procedural law, which provides for different processes where a
possibly immune foreign ofﬁcial is the subject of a request.55
The Majority took the view that ‘the determining factor in assessing whether or not
there has been an attack on the immunity of the Head of State lies in the subjection of
the latter to a constraining act of authority.’56 Looking to the 2005 invitation, the Court
noted that the request ‘was in fact merely an invitation to testify which the Head of
State could freely accept or decline. Consequently, there was no attack by France on
the immunities from criminal jurisdiction enjoyed by the Head of State, since no ob-
ligation was placed upon him. . .’57 This is correct, non-coercive measures do not, in
47 Decision, para 134 48 Decision, para 139.
49 Decision, para 156. 50 para 10.
51 Declaration of Judge Keith, para 10. 52 Decision, para 204.
53 See eg R O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’ (2004) 2 Journal
of International Criminal Justice 735.
54 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v
Belgium) ICJ General List 121, 14 February 2002. See O’Keefe ibid.
55 ibid paras 163,168, 172. 56 Decision, para 170.
57 Decision, para 171.
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themselves, violate immunity.58 Since the 2005 request had no coercive force, and
indeed, as it was not lawfully issued according to French law, had no force whatsoever,
it could not violate international (as opposed to French) law. It is acceptable to ask, but
forbidden to force. The request did not cross the line.
The 2007 request (which also occurred whilst President Guelleh was in France), also
required comment. This request, from the investigating judge, asked the French
Minister of Foreign Affairs to ask Guelleh’s to consent to make a statement, on the
basis of the relevant French procedural law. Djibouti accepted that this was at least
close to compliance with the relevant French law, but claimed the timing implied that
France had dubious ﬁdes on point.59 Given that the French request expressly sought the
consent of President Guelleh, the Court held, rightly, that this did not violate his
immunity.60 Immunity, as they noted, is from coercive process, not requests.
Nonetheless, for heads of State, there is also the question of the respect they are
entitled to outside of immunity. Pursuant to article 29 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, which, although only directly applicable to diplomats, is gen-
erally considered as being applicable, mutatis mutandis, to Heads of State: ‘[t]he
receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to
prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.’61
Both requests had been issued whilst President Guelleh was in France, and had
been reported very quickly by the press.62 The Court was concerned about this, noting
that
by inviting a Head of State to give evidence simply through sending him a facsimile and by
setting him an extremely short deadline without consultation to appear at her ofﬁce, Judge
Cle´ment failed to act in accordance with the courtesies due to a foreign Head of State. . . .It
is regrettable that these procedures [of French procedural law]. . .were not complied with
by the investigating judge and that, whilst being aware of that fact, the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs did not offer apologies to the Djiboutian President, . . . however, it con-
siders that these do not in themselves constitute a violation by France of its international
obligations regarding the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability of
foreign Heads of State. Nevertheless, as the Court has indicated above, an apology would
have been due from France.63
It is worth noting that the Court does not say that these actions violated international
law, it does not claim that an apology was mandatory. And, in the disposition of the
case, the Court does not declare the absence of an apology to have violated any rule of
international law. Assumedly, therefore, they were speaking in terms of comity rather
than legal obligation.64
Had there been some form of French complicity in making the requests public, the
matter might have been different. The Court accepted that article 29 ‘imposes on
receiving States the obligation to protect the honour and dignity of Heads of State, in
58 Judge ad hocYusuf disagreed, Opinion Individuelle de M. le Juge ad hoc Yusuf, paras
36–56. 59 Decision para 177. 60 ibid para 179.
61 On the relationship see J Craig Barker, ‘The Future of Head of State Immunity after Ex
Parte Pinochet’ (1999) 48 ICLQ 937. 62 Decision, para 164.
63 Decision, paras 172–3.
64 Judge Koroma thought that the requirement of an apology ought to have been placed in the
disposition, Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma, paras 12–14. See though H Fox, The Law of State
Immunity (2nd edn, OUP, Oxford, 2008) 688–9.
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connection with their inviolability’.65 As such if France had passed on conﬁdential
information to the media
such an act could have constituted, in the context of an ofﬁcial visit by the Head of State of
Djibouti to France. . .a violation by France of its international obligations. However, the
Court must recognize that it does not possess any probative evidence that would establish
that the French judicial authorities are the source behind the dissemination of the conﬁ-
dential information in question.66
A similar position was taken in relation to the 2007 request, which was also reported
rather quickly by the French press. The reason for rejecting the Djiboutian claims
relating to these (remarkably coincidental) events was thus evidential,67 rather than
conceptual. Judge Skotnikov, however, went further, on the basis that in his view, a
media campaign against a visiting head of State, when the judicial authorities are
involved did not constrain the authority of the Head of State was not unlawful, as it did
not subject him to a ‘constraining act of authority’. If the procedural step (the request)
was not unlawful, informing the media about it would not be either.68 Some scepticism
may be expressed at this, as the Majority noted, since the duties related to inviolability
include some level of protection of dignity, and the ﬁrst request was unlawful under
French law.
F. Other Ofﬁcials
The Court had, of course, also accepted that it had jurisdiction over the summonses of
Djiboutian ofﬁcials (the Head of national security and the procureur de la Re´publique).
This led the Court into an interesting discussion of the immunities of State ofﬁcials.
The two were summonsed as te´moin assiste´s. Djibouti initially claimed that as State
ofﬁcials, they were immune from French jurisdiction, however, later in the process,
conceded that State ofﬁcials are only immune from criminal process with regard to
actions undertaken in their ofﬁcial capacity.69 Very interestingly, given the broad in-
terpretation given to the Yerodia decision in the UK,70 the Court accepted that they
were clearly not entitled to personal immunity.71
The Court chose a narrow ground, however, to reject the claim of functional im-
munity, namely that Djibouti had not raised the matter properly either before French
courts of the ICJ:
At no stage have the French courts (before which the challenge to jurisdiction would
normally be expected to be made), nor indeed this Court, been informed by the
Government of Djibouti that the acts complained of by France were its own acts, and that
the procureur de la Re´publique and the Head of National Security were its organs, agen-
cies or instrumentalities in carrying them out. The State which seeks to claim immunity for
one of its State organs is expected to notify the authorities of the other State concerned.
This would allow the court of the forum State to ensure that it does not fail to respect any
entitlement to immunity and might thereby engage the responsibility of that State. Further,
the State notifying a foreign court that judicial process should not proceed, for reasons of
65 Decision, para 174. It is worth noting that the comments of the court here relate to the
obligations owed to a Head of State when in another country, rather than more generally.
66 Decision, para 185. 67 Decision, paras 179–180.
68 Declaration of Judge Skotnikov, paras 20–22.
69 Decision, paras 185–190.
70 Mofaz, reported in (2008) 53 ICLQ 771. 71 Decision, para 194.
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immunity, against its State organs, is assuming responsibility for any internationally
wrongful act in issue committed by such organs.72
This is interesting, in that the Court ducks the question of whether or not the conduct of
the relevant ofﬁcials actually fell within the functional immunity of the State. The
method of dealing with the question was to deal with it almost as a failure of exhaus-
tion of domestic remedies.73 This might appear idiosyncratic, however the position
taken by the Court is understandable, in that the question was whether France (through
its courts) had violated the functional immunities of the two ofﬁcials, and, since this
had not been claimed before (and thus not ignored by) the French courts, there was no
violation attributable to France.
It might be thought that this is at variance with the fact that immunity of ofﬁcials for
acts within their ofﬁcial duties is a rule of international law, and that, at least under the
UN Convention on the Immunity of States, Courts are under an obligation to deter-
mine, if necessary, any immunity issues ex proprio motu if needs be.74 However, the
Treaty (which is not in force) is not applicable to criminal proceedings.75 Also, here we
are not dealing with those who are personally immune, but State ofﬁcials, whose
conduct is not necessarily that of the State.76 It would be difﬁcult to claim that in such
an instance, a Court needs to look into every nook and cranny for a possible immunity
claim, particularly when, as here, a State has given other reasons for the non-appear-
ance of its ofﬁcials.77 In this particular case, therefore, it is understandable that the
Court took (rather quickly -the reasoning on point is notable by its absence) the view
that Djibouti needed to give France the chance to grant it immunity before (possibly)
raising this elsewhere. On the other hand, though, where such an obligation to inform
has sprung from, other than a general feeling that it would be appropriate, is not clear.
This may be as the Court (except judge ad hoc Yusuf) could agree on result rather than
reasoning.78 In certain other cases, in particular where a person has been held in cus-
tody prior to an immunity claim being belatedly made, more difﬁculties may arise than
here.79 The Rainbow Warrior arbitrations never quite got to grips with this, or settled
the point,80 and it might be thought that the (almost unanimous) Court could have
given this part of the judgment more ‘meat’.
G. Conclusion
This was the ﬁrst time the Court had an opportunity to discuss its jurisdiction pursuant
to article 38(5) of its Rules. It will soon have the chance to return to the matter, in
72 Decision, para 196.
73 On the relationship see Fox (n 64) 142–145.
74 UN Convention, art 5. 75 Fox (n 64) 401–402.
76 On the distinction see R van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Ofﬁcials in
International Criminal Law and International Human Rights Law (OUP, Oxford, 2008) chapter 3.
77 It should be remembered that this is not a question of waiver of immunity, but a matter
prior to that, i.e. whether there is such an arguable claim of immunity that a court could determine.
78 On the tension between the depth of reasoning and the advisability of having opinions
passed by large majorities see I Scobbie, ‘Smoke, Mirrors and Killer Whales: the International
Court’s Opinion on the Israeli Barrier Wall’ (2004) 5 German Law Journal 1107.
79 Such was the case in the well known Caroline incident, see, eg van Alebeek (n 76) 108–10.
80 M Pugh, ‘Legal Aspects of the Rainbow Warrior Affair’ (1987) 36 ICLQ 656; J Scott
Davidson, ‘The Rainbow Warrior Arbitration Concerning the Treatment of the French Agents
Mafart and Prier’ (1991) 40 ICLQ 446.
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relation to the same defendant State.81 The case, on ﬁrst impression, might appear to be
a rather narrow one, when compared, for example, to cases such as the Armed
Activities case,82 and politically less contentious than the Wall Opinion.83 However,
there is much food for thought in the decision, for example on the relationship of
principles of determining jurisdiction in forum prorogatum cases when compared to
other forms of jurisdiction, what is an assertion of jurisdiction, the relationship between
law and comity for the treatment of dignitaries, and the relationship between general
and particular treaties. All of which had an admixture of post-coloniality. In this case,
perhaps there is no little irony that the only violation found related to the issue on
which there was abundantly clear consent by France to the jurisdiction of the Court, the
failure to give reasons for refusal to execute the Djiboutian letter rogatory, and for that
the declaration of violation was considered sufﬁcient recompense.84
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ARREST WARRANT
DECISION FOR PRESIDENT AL BASHIR OF SUDAN
A. Introduction
The International Criminal Court (ICC or the Court) was established on 17 July 1998
by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter ‘Rome Statute’ or
‘Statute’).1 The Rome Statute which entered into force on 1 July 2002 has been widely
ratiﬁed by a vast majority of States demonstrating an increasing international recog-
nition by States of the need to hold individuals accountable for international crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ICC.2 Since the ICC became operational, all its active
investigations carried out by the Ofﬁce of the ICC Prosecutor by the end of 2009 were
in Africa in four situations in The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Northern
Uganda, the Darfur region of Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR). Other
situations were under preliminary examination by the Ofﬁce of the ICC Prosecutor in
Afghanistan, Colombia, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Chad, Georgia, Guinea, Kenya, and Palestine.3
By 2009 the ICC’s highest proﬁle case, which is examined in this article, was the case
81 France similarly consented (before doing so in this case) to the jurisdiction of the Court
pursuant to art 38(5) in the Certain Criminal Proceedings in France case (DRC v France).
82 (DRC v Uganda) Judgment 19 December 2005, ICJ List 116.
83 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
(2004) ICJ Rep 36. 84 Decision, para 204.
* University of Birmingham.
** University of Nottingham.
1 2187 UNTS 90.
2 As of 21 July 2009, 110 States (out of 192 UN Member States) were parties to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court. Out of them 30 were African States, 14 were Asian
States, 17 were from Eastern Europe, 24 were from Latin American and Caribbean States, and 25
were from Western European and other States.
3 See Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor, ICC Prosecutor Conﬁrms Situation in Guinea under
Examination, ICC-OTP-20091014-PR464 (14 October 2009).
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